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Better-informed policymaking through a deeper
understanding of economics.

Summary: The Decline of U.S. Corporate Investment
Seminar by Professor Joao Gomes
U.S. corporations over the past decade have shied away from making large-scale capital investments.
Given their reticence, does it make economic sense for the government to pursue major investments in
infrastructure at this time?
THE AMERICAN ECONOMY CONTEXTUALIZED
A historical view of the U.S. economy reveals a troubling
phenomenon. In 2008, after the recession hit, GDP, investment,
and consumption in the U.S. dropped (as one would expect during
a recession). However, while the nation’s GDP and consumption
recovered by 2012, investment has continued to underperform. In
light of this stagnation, Congress passed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
in 2017, which included tax reductions for U.S. corporations aimed
at stimulating corporate spending. However, based on the limited
data available since then on private sector behavior, it appears
these recent tax cuts may not lead to a significant increase in
corporate capital expenditures. Why is that?

THREE MAJOR DRIVERS OF CORPORATE INVESTMENTS
There are three main drivers for corporate investment: exploitable
profit opportunities, funding costs, and tax/regulatory policies. Let’s
take a closer look at the roles these three drivers have played in
leading the U.S. to a place where corporate investment is severely
depressed.
Profit opportunities are built on the expectation of future economic
growth. However, the U.S. economy has not performed well over
the past decade, and the consensus among economists is that
it will not grow quickly over the next decade either. The U.S. is
going through a period of dramatic economic slowdown triggered
by a shrinking workforce and declining levels of productivity.
During the period from 1950-2016, the U.S. economy grew at an
average annual rate of around 3 percent. Approximately half of
that growth came from an expanding labor force; the other half
from increased labor productivity. Projections from the CBO for
the next decade put average annual growth at just 2 percent. The
U.S. population is aging and the labor force is growing much less

quickly than in the past, and labor force productivity is increasing
at a lower rate too. With fewer people in the labor market to
produce goods and services, collective buying power has declined.
Businesses see these lower projections and hesitate to make large,
expensive investment decisions. It does not make sense to expand
productive capacity when economic conditions do not promise a
commensurate payoff.
While the slowdown in the economy is arguably the most
important reason for the lag in corporate investment, some people
point to the cost of finance as also playing a role. The data, however,
tell a different story. After the start of the Great Recession, banks
indeed became much more nervous about lending, particularly
from 2008-2010. But since 2010, fewer banks have continued to
be restrictive in their lending practices. And interest rates remain
historically low, between 4-5 percent. It seems difficult, then, to
argue that corporations are not making investments because they
cannot raise capital.

“It’s not funding. It’s not
uncertainty. It’s not regulations. It’s
that people don’t look at the US
economy and see the same growth
potential as they did in the past.”
Monthly
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Another explanation for the decline in corporate investment is
uncertainty, particularly uncertainty in the legislative and regulatory
environment. It can be hard to measure the impact of such
uncertainty. But one can look at behavior in purchasing insurance
against stock market volatility--through the Chicago Board Options
Exchange Volatility Index, for instance--to gauge how nervous
investors are about risk. Those data indicate that perceived
business risk spiked from 2008-2010, at the height of the Great
Recession, but since then, the trend in the data does not show a
heightened awareness of risk currently.
In all, then, the ongoing slump in investment does not appear to
be due primarily to uncertainty, or to difficulties gaining access to
capital, but rather to the lack of confidence in the future growth of
the economy. Companies do not see the profit opportunity. Another
term for this state of affairs is “secular stagnation.”

A Case Study: The American Shale Industry
To see the primacy of profit opportunity in driving corporate
investment decisions, one need look no further than
shale. That industry, fueled by fracking, has been the one
sector of the U.S. economy that has seen a tremendous
boom in corporate investment over the past decade.
What is fascinating is that this is a sector defined by many
small firms with limited access to capital markets, and
characterized by great uncertainty (including regulatory
uncertainty), as it is tied to one thing—oil prices, which are
notoriously volatile. Nevertheless, those firms have had
no problem accessing money to make significant capital
investments. Why? Because despite the volatility and
uncertainty, they saw the growth potential in the industry
and therefore the profit opportunity.

INTANGIBLE ASSETS
Quantitative economic models suggest that this secular stagnation
explains between 1/3 and 2/3 of the decline in corporate
investment over the past ten years. It is unclear what accounts
for the rest, but there are two possible explanations that deserve
exploration.
One possible argument goes like this: There has been an increase
in industrial concentration in the U.S.—a result of increased merger
activity, which has increased monopoly power in many sectors.
Monopolies typically raise prices while restricting production and
productive capacity. The common example is the airline industry:
airline mergers have proliferated, leading to fewer airplanes in
service, fewer flights, and higher prices for consumers. In scenarios
such as this, where there is reduced competition and a scaling back
of production, there simply is less need for investment.

Though logically plausible, this argument about industrial
concentration has flaws. For one thing, if industrial concentration
has increased so greatly, why aren’t prices going up more generally?
Why is inflation so low? Consumer prices do not currently suggest
widespread concentration and monopoly power, which makes
it harder to argue that industrial concentration has become so
pervasive as to explain why businesses are not investing.
A second theory argues that maybe the U.S. simply is moving
toward a less capital-intensive economy, from being a
manufacturing based economy to a service based one, in which the
private sector demands more “intangible” assets, as opposed to
traditional physical capital investments.
There are three types of investments that firms can make. One
is equipment: cars, trucks, machinery, and the like. The second is
plants. And the last is intellectual capital—intangibles such as R&D
and software. Looking at the data on the quantity of private capital
used to produce each unit of GDP in the U.S., this is what we see:
the number of physical units of equipment relative to GDP has gone
up slightly, while physical plant has declined dramatically alongside
an equally dramatic increase in the units of intellectual capital. This
suggests that Americans now live in an economy where heavy,
long-lived assets (such as plants, trucks, and physical property) are
simply no longer needed in the same quantities as before. Instead,
companies are becoming more reliant on the intangibles. That is
where the private sector is putting its money.
In all, then, looking at all of the possible explanations for why
companies are spending less and less on capital goods, two of them
emerge as particularly compelling: secular stagnation, combined
with technological changes that have allowed companies to spend
less on physical capital. It is not that companies cannot purchase
capital goods—interest rates are very low. It’s that companies
generally do not want to make such investments. In light of
this trend, let’s take a closer look at the future of infrastructure
spending.

IMPLICATIONS ON INFRASTRUCTURE POLICY
If corporations are communicating, through their behavior, that they
do not want to put money into capital assets, does it make sense
for the government to build and refurbish airports, high-speed
railways, and other major infrastructure projects? Many people
regard infrastructure as the answer to weak economic growth, and
point to China as an example of how infrastructure development
can serve as a driver for a more dynamic economy. But Spain, Italy,
and Greece are telling examples too. Those countries have invested
in major infrastructure projects, but unlike China, have not seen
concomitant economic growth, and instead have experienced great
economic instability and insolvency.
The fact that America’s infrastructure is old is not an economic
rationale for new infrastructure investment. The private sector
is signaling that they are not seeing the value of investing in that
kind of physical capital, even though interest rates for making such
investments are low. Given the reticence of the private sector to
invest in capital goods, it is important that policymakers likewise
consider whether putting money into public capital makes sense
economically.
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